We have grown up, reading about all the good things about Jawaharlal Nehru. Every 14th November, we offered our tributes to him, year after year! Why Nehru’s birthday is celebrated as Children’s Day across India? Was it because little innocent children referred him as Chacha Nehru? What historians falsely portrayed him as ‘spending his entire life for the welfare of children across India’ has well served its purpose.

Jawaharlal Nehru became the 1st Prime Minister of independent India. Thanks to whole-hearted support and endorsement by Mahatma Gandhi! Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel became the Deputy Prime Minister. The British never wanted India to be united. ‘Divide and rule’ was their policy; they advised Nehru that states and kingdoms not willing to accede to the Indian union should not be forced to do so.

Sardar Patel did not pay heed to what the British said. Neither did he listen to Nehru’s orders or sought his opinion in many a matter. While Nehru was more concerned about foreign visits, taking advice of the UN and British officers, and connecting only with the urban elite, Patel spent more time in villages and amid the masses. Using his exemplary skills, he forced all the 550 small princes and zamindars to surrender and accede to Independent India. He even went to the extent of using military force. The united India we witness today from the east to west and north to south are all because of the efforts by Patel.

In earlier article Nehru's Himalayan Blunders which costed India dearly - Pre-Independence, we have already gone through 9 blunders of Nehru. So, here we take it further from that article. 

Nehru with Mountbatten

Blunder–10: Independent India dependent upon the British!

God only knows why India chose to appoint Mountbatten, a British, as the Governor General (GG) of India after independence! Jinnah didn’t do that blunder—he himself became the GG of Pakistan. Mountbatten as GG managed what the Raj desired—to the detriment of India. It was thanks to Nehru that Mountbatten became the GG. Why did the freedom-fighters choose a foreigner, a British, for the top post? Weren’t competent Indians available? If Jinnah as GG could manage Pakistan, couldn’t an Indian as GG manage India?

Nehru plumped for the British Mountbatten

Nehru had adopted Mountbatten as his guru and guide. Reflects much both on Nehru’s colonial mindset, and his judgement of people. Where Nehru was not readily amenable to what the Raj/Mountbatten wanted, Mountbatten  reportedly  used  his  wife  Edwina  to  get  Nehru  around. Maulana Azad, a pro-Nehru person, expressed bewilderment in his autobiography as to how a person like Jawaharlal was won over by Lord Mountbatten;   mentions   Nehru’s   weakness   of   being   impulsive   and amenable to personal influences, and wonders if the Lady Mountbatten factor was responsible for certain [improper] decisions.

Mountbatten was a representative of Britain, and it was natural for him, rather, expected of him, to safeguard and promote the interests of Britain; and keeping the British Government informed of the goings on, including confidential matters. India and Pakistan also had British army chiefs. In case the Indian leaders felt that having a British GG, and a British C-in-C, did help in some way, they should have accounted for the fact that it could also be counter-productive in many cases—and it did prove to be so. Their basic allegiance being to Britain, between them, these British were able to manipulate matters—many contrary to the interests of India.

Much is made of Mountbatten, but he had been a failure in most of his past assignments. He belonged to navy, and in the Admiralty he was long known as the “Master of Disaster”.

Mountbatten was widely held responsible for his gross mismanagement resulting in the horrifying scale of the partition mayhem. Winston Churchill had accused Mountbatten of killing two million Indians!  Mountbatten’s critic Andrew Roberts had commented: “Mountbatten deserved to be court-martialled on his return to London.”

After the partition and its tragedy, there had been three assassination attempts on Jinnah by the aggrieved victims. Jinnah was so rattled he had remarked that the person most responsible for the disaster of partition was Dickie Mountbatten.

Wrote Maulana Azad:

“I also asked Lord Mountbatten to take into consideration the likely consequences of the partition of the country. Even without partition there were riots in Calcutta, Noakhali, Bihar, Bombay and Punjab… If the country was divided in such an atmosphere there would be rivers of blood flowing in different parts of the country and the British would be responsible for such carnage… Without a moment’s hesitation Lord Mountbatten replied,  ‘At  least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that there is no bloodshed or riot. I am a soldier, not a civilian. Once partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances… If there should be slightest agitation, I shall adopt measures to nip the trouble in the bud… I shall order the Army and the Air Force to act and use tanks and aeroplanes to suppress anybody who wants to create trouble.’”

Wrote Durga Das: “I concluded my report by stating that Mountbatten had hurried through with partition without making sure that the Boundary Force would be able to maintain peace.”

Mountbatten machinations in J&K, Junagadh & Hyderabad

Britain wanted Kashmir, a strategic territory, to be under their influence. That was possible if it was either independent or with Pakistan, which was pro-West. Towards this aim, Mountbatten ensured that as GG he did not remain just a titular head. He manipulated to get himself appointed as the ‘Head of the Defence Committee of India’ ensuring that the C-in-C of both the Indian and the Pakistani Army and the Supreme Commander, Auchinleck, reported to him. In that capacity, Mountbatten secretively coordinated with the  transitional British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army; had private strategy sessions with the transitional British C-in-C of the Indian Army, without the knowledge of the Indian leaders; and manipulated to the extent feasible, decisions and actions in the direction the British Government wanted.

Sarila points out in ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’:

“Another factor that distinctly influenced the situation was Nehru’s offer to Mountbatten to chair the Defence Committee of the Indian Cabinet. It was this committee and not the Indian Cabinet as a whole that made decisions on Kashmir war policy. This power gave the governor-general enormous power to influence the course of fighting.”

Nehru was mainly responsible for having Mountbatten appointed as the GG of independent India; and was perhaps the only factor in making him the Head of the Defence Committee.

Wrote Durga Das in ‘India from Curzon to Nehru & After’:

“...Patel added that Nehru was unduly amenable to Mountbatten’s influence. Nehru had ‘always leaned on someone’. He was under Bapu’s protective wing and ‘now he leans on Mountbatten’.”

The role of Mountbatten in the integration of the three states that created problems—Junagadh, Hyderabad and J&K—was dubious. Where the British interests were not affected—in respect of the other Princely States—he did try to help India. But, where the British interests clashed with the Indian interests, he helped the British interests. It was Mountbatten who made Nehru refer the J&K issue to the UN, thus internationalising a domestic issue. Mountbatten attempted to also refer the Junagadh and the Hyderabad cases to the UN.

Jawaharlal Nehru with King Hari Singh

Blunder–11: Nehru refused J&K accession when offered!

By June-July 1947 Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K had begun to take steps towards final accession with India, including replacement of his pro-Pak PM Ram Chandra Kak with Mehr Chand Mahajan, a lawyer, and a Congress nominee on the Boundary Commission, who later became the Chief Justice of India.  Looking to all this, Nehru should have created a conducive atmosphere, and taken Hari Singh into confidence, so that Maharaja’s decision to accede to India could be expedited, and all the subsequent troubles on account of his late accession would have been avoided. Instead, Nehru acted adversarial with the Maharaja.

“There have been suggestions that the Maharaja had decided in August 1947, or certainly by mid-September, that he had no option but to join India, and that he was just waiting for the best moment and the most advantageous terms,” wrote Andrew Whitehead in ‘A Mission in Kashmir’.

When in August–September 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh indeed offered Kashmir's accession to India; most unbelievably, it was refused by Nehru, who first wanted Sheikh Abdullah to be freed and installed as the prime minister of the State — something not acceptable to the Maharaja. Was it not queer? The nation being favoured with accession laying down conditions, rather than the state agreeing to merge! Nehru’s ways, driven by his hubris, were indeed bizarre and alarming!! (In sharp contrast you had Jinnah offering a signed blank sheet along with his own fountain pen to Maharajas of Jodhpur, Jaisalmer, and Bikaner to put down their conditions for accession to Pakistan, saying: “You can fill in all your conditions.”) Had the accession been accepted, the Indian army could have been deployed in Kashmir well in advance of the Oct-47 invasion by the Pakistani-raiders, preventing both the creation of the PoK, and the terrible tragedy of loot, killings and rapes.

States Sarila in ‘The Shadow of the Great Game’:

“Mountbatten added: ‘He [Sardar Patel] has also attacked Nehru for the first time saying “I regret our leader has followed the lofty ideas into the skies and has no contact left with earth or reality”’...This outburst probably reflected Patel’s frustration with Nehru at the time, for refusing to accept the Maharaja of Kashmir’s accession to India unless and until a government under Sheikh Abdullah was installed.”

It was undemocratic and irresponsible of Nehru, and an illegal act, not to have obtained the concurrence of the cabinet before taking such a major decision of not accepting J&K accession. It is Tuite likely that Mountbatten had dissuaded him from accepting accession, as the British wanted J&K to accede to Pakistan.

Blunder–12: Allowing Kashmir to be almost lost

The Pakistani raiders were almost on the outskirts of Srinagar by 22nd October 1947, and the Maharaja desperately sought help from India. Looking to the precarious situation, Sardar Patel proposed sending the Indian Army to J&K. However, Mountbatten insisted that unless the Instrument of Accession was signed by J&K in favour of India (the offer earlier refused by Nehru, most likely at the instance of Mountbatten himself!), India should not send army to Kashmir, and Nehru concurred.

On Friday, 24 October 1947, the Pakistani raiders attacked the Mohore Power House causing black out in Srinagar. Defence Committee of India, headed by Mountbatten, met the next morning on Saturday, 25 October 1947, and rather than ordering action to save Srinagar, directed VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw and a few senior military officers to fly to Srinagar the same day to check the position first hand. This was actually a deliberate ploy of Mountbatten to pass time and not allow counter-action by India, and let Pakistan gain an upper hand by force, as the British desired— because Mountbatten would have known through the British C-in-C of Pakistan what Pakistan was up to. (C-in-C of both India and Pakistan were British!)

VP Menon and company flew to Srinagar and found the state of affairs to be worse than what was reported. They advised Maharaja Hari Singh to hurry to the safety of Jammu. Hari Singh drove the same night to Jammu, 200 kilometres away. MC Mahajan, the premier of J&K, VP Menon, Sam Manekshaw, and colleagues returned to Delhi from Srinagar early next morning on Sunday, 26 October 1947, and reported the desperate situation to the Defence Committee. They advised that it would not be possible to save Srinagar and its people unless the troops were immediately air-lifted.

Even the Srinagar air-strip was in danger of being imminently occupied by the raiders, in which case even that only possibility of air-lifting troops would close.

Notwithstanding the desperate situation, and knowing that unless help was sent immediately, both the Kashmiri Muslims and the Pandits of Srinagar would be butchered by the Pakistani raiders, and the Valley of Kashmir would be lost to Pakistan, Mountbatten still insisted that the Instrument of Accession be first signed in favour of India. Nehru simply went along with his guru Mountbatten. It didn’t seem illegal to Mountbatten and Nehru that the raiders backed by the Pakistani army had invaded J&K, which had not signed any Instrument of Accession in Pakistan’s favour; but it seemed illegal to them to send Indian army help to save people getting looted, raped and butchered!

As desired, VP Menon flew to Jammu the same day—Sunday, 26 October 1947—to have the Instrument of Accession signed by Maharaja Hari Singh, which he did. The Instrument of Accession signed by Hari Singh on Sunday, 26 October 1947, and brought back by VP Menon, was accepted by Mountbatten on Monday, 27 October 1947. With the signing of the Instrument and its acceptance, J&K legally became a part of India, and it became incumbent upon India to defend its territory, and throw out the raiders.

In the Defence Committee meeting held on Monday, 27 October 1947 Sam Manekshaw apprised the members of the Military situation. He said the raiders were hardly seven to nine kilometres from Srinagar; and unless the troops were flown in immediately, Srinagar would be lost, because going by road would take days, and once the raiders got to the airport and Srinagar, it would not be possible to fly-in the troops. He further informed that everything was ready at the airport, and the troops could be immediately air-lifted, once the orders were issued.

However, Mountbatten — serving the pro-Pakistani British interests — tried to stall sending the Indian army, saying it was too late, raiders being already at the door of Srinagar. But, who made it late in the first place— Mountbatten himself! As usual, Nehru prevaricated.

Notably, even when the need for action became urgent, “Mountbatten threw his weight against any precipitate action, emphasising the need for further information,” writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’. Even after further information was available through VP Menon and Sam Manekshaw, who had been specially flown to Srinagar for the purpose on 25 October 1947, and who advised urgent airlift of troops, Mountbatten showed reluctance. Writes Dasgupta “...the service chiefs [all British], supported by Mountbatten, sought to dissuade the ministers from an airlift on the grounds that it involved great risks and dangers.”

Sardar Patel finally intervened. Recounted Sam Manekshaw, who later became the first Field Marshal in the Indian army, in his interview with Prem Shankar Jha.

“At the morning meeting he [VP Menon/Patel] handed over the(Accession) thing. Mountbatten turned around and said, ‘come on Manekji (He called me Manekji instead of Manekshaw), what is the military situation?’ I gave him the military situation, and told him that unless we flew in troops immediately, we would have lost Srinagar, because going by road would take days, and once the tribesmen got to the airport and Srinagar, we couldn't fly troops in. Everything was ready at the airport. As usual Nehru talked about the United Nations, Russia, Africa, God almighty, everybody, until Sardar Patel lost his temper. He said, ‘Jawaharlal, do you want Kashmir, or do you want to give it away.’ He (Nehru) said, ‘Of course, I want Kashmir.’ Then he (Patel) said ‘Please give your orders.’ And before he could say anything Sardar Patel turned to me and said, ‘You have got your orders.’ I walked out, and we started flying in troops...”

It has also been reported that the J&K premier, Mehar Chand Mahajan, even threatened to proceed to Karachi and offer Kashmir to Jinnah, if India could not secure safety of the people of J&K. Despite tremendous practical difficulties, lack of preparation, and the short notice, the Indian Army rose to the occasion and chased the raiders out of the valley. It is worth factoring-in the fact that had the Indian army not reached Srinagar in time, there would have been a large-scale massacre and mayhem by the Pakistani raiders in Srinagar and surrounding areas, which in turn would have had repercussions all over India.  But, Mountbatten and the British didn’t seem to value Indian lives.  British were serving pro-Pakistani British interests. But, Nehru? Had Sardar Patel not acted, and had it been left to Nehru and Mountbatten, the whole of Kashmir would have been lost to Pakistan, and the locals would have been butchered.

Jawaharlal Nehru with Sheikh Abdullah

Blunder–13: Unconditional J&K accession made conditional

Was the ‘Instrument of Accession’ signed by Maharaja Hari Singh for J&K different from the other Princely States, and did it incorporate some special provisions? NO. The Instrument of Accession was standard and common for all Princely States. There was no provision in it for any ruler to add or subtract conditions. It was required to be signed unchanged.

Enclosing his signed ‘Instrument of Accession’ in the standard format (like for all the other princely states), Maharaja Hari Singh wrote to the Governor-General of India Mountbatten on 26 October 1947:

“With the conditions obtaining at present in my state and the great emergency of the situation as it exists, I have no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion. Naturally they cannot send the help asked for by me without my State acceding to the Dominion of India. I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government.”

With regard to J&K, it is worth re-emphasising that (a) the Instrument of Accession signed was no different from those signed by the other Princely States; (b) it was signed by Hari Singh unconditionally; and (c) it was accepted by the Governor General, Lord Mountbatten, unconditionally. That is, the whole process was no different from the one that applied to the other 547 Princely States that acceded to India (please note that the other 14 of the 562 had acceded to Pakistan).

Through a separate letter, however, Mountbatten advised Maharaja Hari Singh that the accession was subject to reference to the people of J&K:

“In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistent with their policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession should be settled by a reference to the people...”

Notably, the Maharaja had put no conditions on accession. In fact, even Sheikh Abdullah, who had favoured accession to India, never insisted on this condition—rather, he wanted it to be unconditional, lest any uncertainty should remain.

Who gave Mountbatten the authority to write such a letter? Who was he to make the accession conditional? Was he still the Viceroy of the British India serving the British interests, or was he the Governor General of independent India? Why did Nehru not object? Why had the Indian Cabinet and leaders, particularly Nehru, not made it clear to him that he could not act on his own on critical matters — that he had to take the permission of the cabinet? One can understand conditions being stipulated by the party offering you the favour of accession. But, for the party being favoured with accession to stipulate conditions—that’s absurd.

Had it been a Governor General who was an Indian like say Dr Ambedkar or Dr Rajendra Prasad or Rajagopalachari or Mahatma Gandhi (Wonder why he didn’t wish to take on any official responsibility after independence, and leave the top post to a British!) himself, and not a British like Mountbatten, would he have tried to make the accession conditional? And, had he done so, would the Indian public have ever forgiven him? Or, was it that Nehru acquiesced to writing of such a letter by Mountbatten? (—yet another blunder?) Even if the deed was done without Nehru’s knowledge (unlikely), Nehru should have objected to it and should have got it annulled or withdrawn.

Stipulation of ‘Reference to People’: Illegal

The Indian Independence Act 1947 enacted by the British Parliament also incorporated the Memorandum on States’ Treaties and Paramountcy of 12 May 1946 as per which the princely states were to regain full sovereignty with the creation of the two dominions of India and Pakistan from the British India on 15 August 1947, with the ruler of the Princely State being the ONLY authority to offer accession to India or Pakistan, or to  remain independent, regardless of the religious composition of the people of that state, there being NO provision for ‘reference to the people’ or plebiscite.

Therefore, with the signing of the Instrument of Accession unconditionally by the Maharaja of J&K on 26 October 1947 in favour of India, J&K’s accession to India was full, final, irrevocable and totally legal as per the International   Law.  Legally, that separate   letter of Mountbatten made absolutely NO difference. In fact, Mountbatten’s action of writing the above letter was unconstitutional and illegal. Even Nehru had NO legal authority to approve of such a letter. What is more, there was NO cabinet sanction for it!

India should have stuck to this incontestable legal position of the irrevocable accession of J&K to India, like for the other 547 states, on the strength of the signing of the Instrument of Accession. This is what Sardar Patel strongly advocated. Even US considered ours as an ironclad legal position in 1948. Writes C Dasgupta in his book, ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’: “The fundamental difference between the American and British positions lay in the fact that the United States was prepared in 1947-48 to recognise India’s sovereign rights in Kashmir.”  However, Nehru failed to leverage on that.

The funny thing is that the "reference to the people" or plebiscite was requested neither by Maharaja Hari Singh, nor by Sheikh Abdullah, nor by the people of J&K, nor even by Jinnah(!!) at that time! It was only thanks to Mountbatten and Nehru!

Kashmir issue in UN

Blunder–14: Internationalisation of the Kashmir issue

Nehru unnecessarily internationalised what was purely an internal issue by taking the J&K issue to the UN, again under the influence of the British Mountbatten. Wrote V Shankar in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel, Volume 1’:

“Lord Mountbatten persuaded Pandit Nehru to make a broadcast in which he was to announce that the accession would be subject to a plebiscite under the UN auspices. This was scheduled at 8.30pm on 28 October [1947]. Sardar used to insist on seeing the texts of important broadcasts including those of the prime minister. Pandit Nehru had a very busy day and could not send the text before 8.15pm. Sardar read it and noticed the embarrassing commitment. He tried to contact Pandit Nehru but the latter had left for the Broadcasting House. Sardar then commissioned me to go to the Broadcasting House and ask Pandit Nehru to delete the offending phrase 'under UN auspices'...” However, by the time Shankar reached the place, the Mountbatten-inspired deed was done by Nehru. It was imprudent on the part of Nehru to have made this commitment of “plebiscite under UN auspices” at the instance of a British, Lord Mountbatten, having his own axe to grind, without taking the cabinet and the patriotic Indians who mattered — Sardar Patel and others — into confidence! Wrote the veteran Congressman DP Mishra:

Reference to the UN was something Sardar Patel, Dr Ambedkar and others were against; however, Nehru again went ahead with it publicly in his radio broadcast on 2nd November 1947.  Despite sane advice, Nehru scored a self-goal for India by formally referring the J&K matter to the UN on 1 January 1948. With the issue internationalised, India suffered greatly, both domestically and internationally. It became like the sword of Damocles. The UK, the US and their allies, led by the UK, began playing politics of favouring Pakistan over India, ignoring the fact of Pakistani aggression in J&K.

That the member-nations of the UNSC acted in their own selfish national interests and engaged in power-game was apparently not known to the foreign-affairs expert Nehru. As usual, Nehru himself realised his blunder after the act. Nehru regretted the Kashmir issue “has been raised to an international level… by reference to the Security Council of the UN and most of the great powers are intensely interested in what happens in Kashmir… [Kashmir issue] has given us a great deal of trouble… the attitude of the great powers has been astonishing. Some of them have shown active partisanship for Pakistan… We feel we have not been given a square deal.”

In addition to towing the British Mountbatten Line, did Nehru's Marxist-Communist bend drive the plebiscite decision?

Commented Sita Ram Goel: “Pandit Nehru promised a plebiscite in Kashmir without consulting any of his cabinet colleagues or even Mahatma Gandhi. I refer … to the Memorandum which the CPI [Communist Party of India] had submitted to the British Cabinet Mission and in which Kashmir was described as a separate nationality which should be given the right of self-determination to the point of becoming a sovereign State. The CPI had denounced Kashmir's accession to India as an imperialist annexation in early 1948. The Indian army in Kashmir had been described as an army of occupation in all official Soviet publications at that time. So Pandit Nehru's communist conscience suffered persistent pricks. He not only promised a plebiscite but also ordered the Indian Army to stop its triumphant march into Pakistan-occupied    Kashmir. He changed his stand on a plebiscite in Kashmir only when the Soviet Union and the CPI had changed their stand and come out in support of the Indian case in Kashmir after Pakistan entered into an alliance with America. And he let loose a lying campaign against the West which was only reminding him half-heartedly of the plebiscite promise he had himself made earlier.”

Blunder–15: Inept handling of the J&K issue in the UN

India and Pakistan presented their cases at the UN in January 1948. The Indian case was presented by Gopalaswami Aiyangar, Minister for Kashmir Affairs, specifically appointed by Nehru in his cabinet. Aiyangar was the leader of the Indian team that also included Sheikh Abdullah. Quipped Chaudhry Sir Muhammad Zafrullah Khan (1893-1985), the Pakistani representative in the UN, when he came to know about Gopalaswami Aiyangar as India’s representative: “You are offering me Kashmir on a platter.”

It is worth noting that Zafrullah Khan had an illustrious career. Educated at London’s King’s College, he had been a member of the All-India Muslim League, and had served as its president between 1931 and 1932. He was the Minister of Railway of British India in 1935. He sat on the British Viceroy's Executive Council as its Muslim member between 1935 and 1941. He represented India at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1939. He was the Agent-General of British India to China in 1942. He became judge at the Federal Court of India. He was the foreign minister of Pakistan (1947-54), the president for the UN General Assembly (1962), and the judge (1954-61, 1964-73), vice-president (1958-61) and the president (1970-73) of the International Court of Justice.

(Incidentally, Zafrullah Khan was an Ahmadiyya, like Abdus Salam (1926–1996), a Pakistani theoretical physicist, who shared the 1979 Nobel Prize in Physics. Abdus Salam left Pakistan in 1974 in protest against the passage of the parliamentary bill declaring the Ahmadiyya Community as NOT-Islamic. Jinnah and Aga Khan, both Shias, were the prime movers of Pakistan. Shias too are at the receiving end in Pakistan.)

Expectedly, while Zafrullah Khan’s presentation was brilliant, and received all-round praise, that of Aiyangar’s was an unmitigated disaster!

Earlier, instead of Aiyangar, the name of Sir Girija Shankar Bajpai, the then Secretary-General (senior-most position) in the Ministry of External Affairs and certainly a much more capable person for the purpose, was suggested; but, on account of opposition he was dropped, as he was known to have been too close to the British during the pre-independence period.

But then, why was he made the Secretary-General by Nehru in the first place!

Sardar Patel was opposed to Gopalaswami Aiyangar leading the Indian team in the UN. He considered him to be not competent enough. Patel had instead suggested the name of CP Ramaswami Iyer, who had been the Diwan of Travancore. CP, as he was called, was a very competent intellectual, statesman and a diplomat, with many foreign contacts in the UK and the US. He would have presented India’s case effectively. But, Nehru ignored Patel’s advice, and stuck to Gopalaswami Aiyangar. Here is a tell-tale description of what happened in the UN, as told by Shakunthala Jagannathan, CP’s granddaughter:

“I was a student living in New York, when the question of Kashmir came up in the U.N. Accompanied by several Indian and American friends, I attended the Security council session, oozing with confidence on India’s stand. First came Sir Zafrullah Khan’s impassioned and brilliant speech on behalf of Pakistan which was powerful enough to shake up our confidence. When he sat down, we Indians breathed a sigh of relief. The Indian delegation was then asked to present their case. The delegate concerned put up his hand, stood up, and said, “I protest!” … We had expected that our case, so much stronger, would shake up the U.N.! Instead, our presentation on that day resulted in a debacle, right before our eyes...”

Yet another wrong choice of Nehru was to include Sheikh Abdullah in the Indian delegation. Wrote Howard Schaffer: “The Indians had made Abdullah a member of their UN delegation, no doubt in the expectation that he would be an effective spokesman for India’s cause. They could not have calculated that he would undercut their position by calling for Kashmir’s independence in a private conversation with Austin. Apparently caught by surprise, the ambassador gave Abdullah no encouragement...” Incidentally, Warren R. Austin was the US permanent representative—their ambassador—to the UN.

Nehru’s initial blunder was to take an internal, domestic matter of India to the UN, and make it international. However, having done that blunder, it was expected of Nehru to put his best foot forward, and win the case for India. Unfortunately for India, Nehru obliged Pakistan with a follow-up blunder: appointing an incompetent to present India’s case!

Nehru and Patel disagreement on Kashmir

Blunder–16: POK thanks to Nehru

It was thanks to Nehru’s wrong decision that ‘Pakistan Occupied Kashmir’ (PoK) came into existence, when the Indian army was on the verge of getting the whole of J&K vacated. Let’s look at the two concrete cases from among the many feats of daring and bravery by the Indian army.

Pakistani raiders’ determined bid to occupy Ladakh was frustrated by the superior Indian strategy of airlifting troops to Leh. Air Commodore Mehar Chand flew his plane amazingly to 23,000 feet above sea-level— without oxygen—on an unchartered course to land his plane, with troops, at Leh at the height of about 12000 feet! Another daring feat was that of Major-General Thimayya. He took his tanks to a height of about 12000 feet on the snow-capped Zojila Pass— something unique in history, as nobody had taken tanks to such heights and in such hazardous conditions before—and routed the enemy, destroying all enemy bunkers.

Incidentally, it was this brave and competent Thimayya who was humiliated by Krishna Menon, when he was Defence Minister in Nehru’s cabinet, forcing Thimayya to resign! Later, after Thimayya withdrew his resignation at the instance of Nehru, even Nehru behaved with him in a way that amounted to his double humiliation!!

Thanks to the Indian Army, the raiders were forced to retreat, and were on the run. This war, started by Pakistan in October 1947, lasted 15 months, and ended on 1 January 1949.

How Nehru allowed creation of POK

The capture of Muzzafarabad, now the capital of PoK, was imminent. The Army, however, was ordered to suspend all offensive operations with effect from 1 January 1949, even though the enemy did not cease fighting. The Indian Army was very disappointed by the decision, but orders were orders. Thanks to ordering of ceasefire with immediate effect by Nehru, PoK — Pakistan Occupied Kashmir—came into existence; else the whole of Kashmir would have been with India. And, now it is this PoK which is used by Pakistan to send terrorists into J&K.

Shakespeare had rightly articulated:

There is a tide in the affairs of men,
Which, taken at the flood, leads on to fortune
Omitted, all the voyage of their life
Is bound in shallows and in miseries
And we must take the current when it serves,
Or lose our ventures

As per a report, the ceasefire decision was remote-controlled by Mountbatten, who was by then back in England — such influence Mountbatten still exercised over Nehru. Commented General SPP Thorat:

“Our forces might have succeeded in evicting the invaders, if the Prime Minister had not held them in check, and later ordered the ceasefire… Obviously great pressure must have been brought to bear on him by the [former Governor-General] … Panditji was a great personal and family friend of Lord Mountbatten.”

The military commanders directly involved in the operations of clearing J&K from the raiders and the Pak-army were General Officer C-in-C, Western Command, KM Cariappa, and the Operational Commander Major-General Thimayya.

As per the biography of late Field Marshal KM Cariappa, they both requested Nehru in December 1948 for a little more time to clear J&K of Pakistani raiders completely, but Nehru did not heed them. Thimayya had told Nehru that the Army needed two weeks more to regain lost territory but Nehru was adamant. It is said that Thimayya found Nehru’s attitude inexplicable, and left Teen Murti Bhavan, the official residence of the PM, in disgust. When Cariappa asked Nehru about the decision a few years later, Nehru conceded that the ceasefire order ought to have been delayed!

Britain had marked out two areas that had to absolutely go to Pakistan — despite J&K accession to India: (a) One was the northern area along the Chinese, Russian and Afghanistan borders comprising Gilgit, Hunza, Nagar, Swat and Chitral. This area commanded as much strategic importance to Britain and the West as NWFP in Pakistan. Mountbatten had ensured NWFP went to Pakistan, even though its leader, Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, was opposed to the partition of India. (b)The other area was the western strip adjoining Pakistani Punjab to secure Pakistan from India, comprising Muzzafarabad, Mirpur, Bhimbar, Kotli and adjoining areas. Muzzafarabad is now the capital of PoK. What the British had planned, they managed to achieve — thanks to the way Nehru acted, or failed to act. How the British managed to fool India even after independence! Reflects very poorly on the then Indian leadership.

After J&K acceded to India on 26 October 1947, Major William Brown of the Gilgit Scouts, although a British contract officer of the Maharaja of J&K, had the Governor Ghansara Singh imprisoned on 31 October 1947, as per a pre-meditated plan, and hoisted the Pakistani flag there on 2 November 1947, and declared its accession to Pakistan! This was totally an illegal action on the part of the British meant to deliberately deny India access to Central Asia.  Mountbatten would surely have known of the goings on, but did nothing, or rather, allowed the illegality to quietly happen. Major Khurshid Anwar was one of the Pakistani army officers who had organised and lead the Pakistani Pathan tribal invasion of J&K. His deputy, Major Aslam Khan, took charge of Gilgit from Brown. In 1948, Brown was honoured with the “Most Exalted Order of the British Empire”.

Wrote NV Gadgil, the then Cabinet Minister for Works and Mines in the Nehru’s Cabinet, in his autobiography ‘Government from Inside’:

“In truth, Nehru did not show much enthusiasm for Kashmir’s accession at the time… Both the Maharaja and [Meherchand] Mahajan [Premier of Kashmir] pressed for the acceptance of Kashmir’s accession, but Nehru would not move. [Nehru then was being guided by Sheikh Abdullah] … If our army had not received instructions to stop fighting before that date [1 January 1949], it would have cleared the raiders from whole of Kashmir…

“The restrain imposed upon our army was motivated by the hope that Pakistan would be satisfied with a bit of Kashmir occupied by it. Of course, some of us opposed this view… Sheikh Abdullah was an ordinary person elevated to an extraordinary position by the Government of India [Nehru]…

“I am afraid that Nehru is responsible for the prolongation of the problem through his willingness to compromise at every stage... Had Vallabhbhai [Patel] been the man to handle the Kashmir question, he would have settled it long ago. At least, he would never have settled with a partial control of Jammu & Kashmir. He would have occupied the whole of the State and would never have allowed it to be elevated to international importance.”

MO Mathai, the then private secretary to Nehru, wrote: “Nehru… ordered a ceasefire in Kashmir at a time when our forces were in a sound position and poised to roll back the enemy. Nehru’s decision, which was impulsive, was a grievous error much resented by the armed forces. Nehru’s was an imitative and an absorptive mind… Essentially, Gandhi’s was an original mind, while Nehru’s was a second-rate one. He was all heart and less mind. This is reflected in his books also.”

Wrote BM Kaul in ‘Confrontation with Pakistan’: “We were politically unwise in accepting the ceasefire in view of our successes at the time in Uri, Tithwal, and Kargil.” As per the article “Nehru’s Pacifism and the Failed Recapture of Kashmir” by Sandeep Bamzai in ORF:

“To keep abreast with the developments in Kashmir, Nehru had dispatched his private secretary and ‘eyes and ears’ Dwarka Nath Kachru to the frontline...

“Some of Kachru's correspondence is extremely damaging, the prism far too revealing of how the Indian Army first pushed back the raiders and then vanquished the Pakistan Army regulars, even having them on the run... Previously unpublished correspondence [Nehru-Kachru] reveal that Nehru's pacifism—guided by the principles of fair play [?!] and the fact that India  had referred the Kashmir matter to the United Nations erroneously on Lord Mountbatten's insistence — meant that the Indian Army was refused permission to go all the way and reclaim what eventually became PoK and the Northern Areas…”

Nehru can be squarely blamed for the creation of the J&K problem, and the creation of the PoK.

Blunder–17: Nehru's shocking callousness in J&K

Here is an account by of a Hindu survivor who was a witness to the Mirpur tragedy in J&K, reproduced from the Swarajya Mag:

“On November 23 [1947], Prem Nath Dogra and Professor Balraj Madhok met Brigadier Paranjape, the Brigade Commander of the Indian Army in Jammu, and requested him to send reinforcements to Mirpur [a strategic place where more than one hundred thousand Hindus and Sikhs were held up during first Pakistani aggression over Kashmir]. Paranjape shared their agony but expressed his helplessness because — as per instructions from the army generals — consultation with Sheikh Abdullah was mandatory in order to deploy Indian troops anywhere in Jammu and Kashmir. Paranjape also informed the delegation that Pandit Nehru would come to Srinagar on November 24 [1947] and they should meet him. On November 24, Pandit Dogra and Professor Madhok met Nehru and once again told him about the critical situation in Mirpur. They requested him to order immediate Indian troops reinforcement to the beleaguered Mirpur City. Professor Madhok was amazed at Pandit Nehru’s response — Pandit Nehru flew into a rage and yelled that they should talk to Sheikh Abdullah. Prof Madhok again told Pandit Nehru that Sheikh Abdullah was indifferent to the plight of the Jammu province and only Pandit Nehru could save the people of Mirpur. However, Pandit Nehru ignored all their entreaties and did not send any reinforcements to Mirpur.”

Mirpur later fell to Pakistani artillery, and became part of PoK. The Hindus and Sikhs encountered a genocide, and worst orgies of rape and barbarity.

Blunder – 18: Article - 370, thanks to Nehru

Article-370 on J&K is thanks to Nehru, who brought it about at the instance of Sheikh Abdullah, despite opposition by many, including Dr BR Ambedkar and Sardar Patel.

Gopalaswami Aiyangar, appointed by Nehru, moved Article 306A — which later became Article 370 in the Indian Constitution — in the Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949 guaranteeing special status to J&K. This was at the instance of Sheikh Abdullah, and with the concurrence of Nehru. Although many in the Constituent Assembly were not in favour of it, they consented, keeping in view Nehru’s wish, who was then the main person steering the J&K policy. Those not in favour included Ambedkar, Maulana Hasrat Mohani, Sardar Patel, and many others. India, which was a Dominion, became a Republic on 26 January 1950, and Article 370 came into force for J&K. Why was special provision made for J&K? Why Article 370? Let’s examine.

J&K had nominated four representatives to the Indian Constituent Assembly in June 1949 — the nominations were made by Yuvraj Karan Singh on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State’s Interim Government led by Sheikh Abdullah. The J&K representatives in the Indian Constituent Assembly chose to act differently from the other Princely States — at the behest of Sheikh Abdullah. While the other Princely States were agreeable to a common Constitution, J&K representatives stated they were not inclined to accept the future Constitution of India, and they would rather have their own separate State Constitution. This, they insisted, was allowed as per clause 7 of the Instrument of Accession. It is another matter that the representatives of the other States could also have taken the same position as J&K, for they too had signed the Instrument of Accession, which had the same content and format as that signed for J&K by the Maharaja. The J&K representatives also stated that till their new State Constitution was framed, they would be governed by the old Constitution Act of 1939.

It was to accommodate this that a special provision had to be made for J&K in the Constitution of India. That provision is Article 370. Of course, Article 370, labelled "Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir" was conceived as a temporary arrangement, with hopes of a full integration in time to come. J&K State Constitution came into effect on 26 January 1957, comprising 158 Sections, of which Section 3 says, “The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.”

But why were such special provisions allowed. They could have been blocked by the Constituent Assembly? Interestingly, poor Maharaja Hari Singh was already out of the picture. Special provisions or no special provisions — he stood neither to gain nor to lose. It was Abdullah, who after getting rid of the Maharaja, was trying to secure and upgrade his own status.

Nehru had brought in Gopalaswami Ayyangar as a Minister without Portfolio to look after the J&K affairs. Before his visit to Europe, Nehru had finalised the draft provisions relating to J&K with Sheikh Abdullah, which later became Article 370. He had entrusted to Gopalaswami Ayyangar the task of piloting these provisions through the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar did the needful. His presentation provoked angry protests from all sides. Most were opposed to any discriminatory treatment for J&K. The proposal of Article 370 was torn to pieces by the Constituent Assembly. Ayyangar was the lone defender, and Maulana Azad was not able to effectively support him. In the debate, Maulana Hasrat Mohani of UP stated that while he was not opposed to all the concessions that were being granted to his friend Sheikh Abdullah, why make such discrimination; if all those concessions were to be granted to the Kashmir, why not to the Baroda ruler too.

Dr Ambedkar was firmly opposed to it. Nehru had sent Abdullah to Dr Ambedkar to explain to him the position and to draft an appropriate Article for the Constitution. Ambedkar had remarked:

“Mr Abdullah, you want that India should defend Kashmir, India should develop Kashmir and Kashmiris should have equal rights as the citizens of India, but you don’t want India and any citizen of India to have any rights in Kashmir. I am the Law minister of India. I cannot betray the interest of my country.”

Upon the refusal of Dr Ambedkar to draft Article-370, it was left to Gopalaswami Ayyangar to draft the same. When the issue came up for discussion in the Constituent Assembly, Dr Ambedkar was so disgusted that he did not take part in it.

Nehru, who was then abroad, rang up Patel and requested him to get the Article 370 through, and it was for that reason alone that Patel relented, as Sardar did not wish to embarrass Nehru in his absence. But Sardar commented, “Jawaharlal royega [Nehru will rue this].”

Strangely, Nehru made a statement on Kashmir in 1952, when Sardar Patel was no more, “Sardar Patel was all the time dealing with these matters.” Wrote V Shankar:

“When I was working as his [Gopalaswami Ayyangar] joint secretary the self-same Article [370] came in for criticism in the Lok Sabha. In defence, Pandit Nehru took the stand that the Article was dealt with by Sardar in his absence and he was not responsible for it. I met Gopalaswami the same day evening as he was walking on the lawn of his residence. I questioned the bonafides of Pandit Nehru’s stand. Gopalaswami’s reaction was one of anger and he said, ‘It is an ill return to the Sardar for the magnanimity he had shown in accepting Panditji’s point of view against his better judgment.’ He added, ‘I have told Jawaharlal this already.’”

Of course, the biggest negative is that it has come in the way of full integration of the State, which has gravely harmed both the people of J&K and India. Article 370 helps protect the corrupt J&K politicians from the more stringent central provisions, and keeps them out of reach of the CAG. To the general public, it does not benefit. It is actually counter- productive. If J&K were like any other state in India, there would have been much more private investment in it, leading to prosperity.

Even if Article 370 had to be introduced for whatever reason, it could have been made applicable only to the Valley, and Jammu and Ladakh could have been kept out through certain special provisions, or by spinning them off as separate mini-states or union territories. That would at least have ensured Jammu and Ladakh developed unhindered by the needless restrictions that were the by-products of Article 370. Why make Jammu and Ladakh suffer for the politics of the Valley? There are enough statistics to show that the people of Jammu and Ladakh have been short-changed and benefits have been largely cornered for the Valley.

Blunder–19: Article 35A for J&K, again thanks to Nehru

Following the ‘1952 Delhi Agreement’ between Nehru and the then J&K Premier Sheikh Abdullah, Article 35A was added to the Indian Constitution in a hush-hush manner (without routing it through the Parliament as required under Article 368) through a Presidential Order of 1954 (in exercise of the powers conferred by Article 370) on the advice of the Union Government headed by Nehru empowering the J&K state to define ‘Permanent Residents’ (PR) of the state, and accord them rights and privileges denied to other citizens of India.

Under the above provisions ‘Permanent Resident Certificates’ (PRC) are issued to the Permanent Residents of J&K. Among the debilitating and discriminating provisions for the Indian citizens who don’t hold PRCs are that they can’t own immovable property in J&K, they can’t get jobs in the J&K govt, they can’t get admission in a college run by the J&K govt, nor avail of any scholarships. Also, if a woman who holds a PRC marries a man who doesn’t hold a PRC then her children and husband can’t exercise any right in the state, are not entitled to PRC, and can’t inherit her immovable property in J&K.

This Article 35A, along with the Article 370, had been at the root of non-complete integration of J&K with India, and hinders development of the region, as outsiders are handicapped in investing in the region. The Article had since been challenged in the Supreme Court on several strong grounds, some of which are as follows. (a) It was illegal because it was added to the Constitution without following the proper, laid-down (under Article 368) procedure of the Parliamentary route. (b) It violated Article 14: Equality before the Law. (c) It violated women’s right to marry as per their choice.

It is ironical that Article 35A was supposed to be an extension of Article 35 which dealt with the ‘Fundamental Rights’ when 35A actually violateed the fundamental rights of an overwhelming majority. Curiously, 35A was not listed after Article 35 in the Constitution, but is included in the Appendix.

A telling example of the consequences of the iniquitous Article 35A is the plight of about 200 Valmiki families brought to J&K as ‘Safai Karamcharis’ (Sanitary workers) in the 1950s on the promise of grant of PRC. However, even after many decades PRCs have not been granted to them, and to their children. Many, who have since acquired required educational qualifications, can’t apply for government jobs in the absence of PRC. They can vote for the Lok Sabha elections but not for J&K legislature, or for the local bodies. Their colony has not been regularised. Another painful example is that of about two lakh Hindu-Sikh refugees who migrated to J&K from West Pakistan in 1947 after Partition — none has received PRC, and they can neither acquire immovable property in J&K, nor avail of educational and other facilities in J&K, nor get government jobs! They are Indian nationals, but not citizens of the J&K state. Their cry for justice has gone unheard for decades.

The worst thing about the Article was that although passed on 14 May 1954, it was made applicable retrospectively from 14 May 1944, well before independence! Hindus from Pakistan entered Jammu in 1947 after partition, and were thus handicapped, thanks to this Article—demonstrates how insensitive Nehru was to their plight. Had they been Muslims Nehru’s stand would have been different and accommodating—like it was in case of the Muslims from East Bengal.

Nehru and Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah

Blunder–20: Nehru's blood brother who deceived

A critical player in the J&K saga was Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, born in 1905 in Soura, a village on the outskirts of Srinagar. He became famous as Sher-e-Kashmir: The Lion of Kashmir. Sheikh Abdullah’s father was Sheikh Mohammed Ibrahim, a middle-class manufacturer and trader of shawls. Sheikh Abdullah’s grandfather was a Hindu Kashmiri Pandit by the name of Ragho Ram Koul, who was converted to Islam in 1890 and was named Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah, the name his grandson took. Sheikh Abdullah married Akbar Jahan in 1933. She was daughter of Michael Harry Nedou and his Kashmiri wife. Michael owned a hotel at the tourist resort of Gulmarg — his father was a European proprietor of a chain of hotels in India including Nedous Hotel in Srinagar.

Sheikh Abdullah did MSc in Chemistry from Aligarh Muslim University in 1930. It was at the University that he became politically active. He formed the Muslim Conference, Kashmir's first political party, in 1932, and later renamed it to National Conference in 1938. The Muslim Conference founded by Sheikh Abdullah was reportedly communal: some say that he later changed its name to National Conference only for tactical reasons.  Sheikh Abdullah was a protagonist of Kashmiri nationalism linked to Islam; and his role model was Dr Mohammad Iqbal, a scion of another Kashmiri Pundit convert to Islam — like himself — who propounded the ideology of Pakistan way back in 1930.

Although Gandhi had thought it prudent to keep himself aloof from the affairs of the Princely States, Nehru had set up “The All-India States' Peoples' Conference” for the States in 1939. Nehru had associated himself with Sheikh Abdullah in that capacity. He was supportive of his agitations. Sheikh Abdullah had launched the ‘Quit Kashmir’ agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest. The agitation, felt most Congress leaders, was opportunist and malevolent, and driven by selfish consideration of self-promotion — after all, Maharaja was not an outsider like the British. Sheikh Abdullah indulged in such acts knowing he would receive tacit support of Nehru. Although Sheikh Abdullah had tried to project his fight against the Maharaja as a fight against the feudal order, and a fight for the people of J&K — something the gullible, socialist Nehru believed — in reality his purpose was communal, to get Muslim support, and grab power.

Alarmed at the acts of Sheikh Abdullah, and Nehru’s support to him, the Kashmiri Pandits had telegrammed Sardar Patel on 4 June 1947:

“The statements of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru concerning Kashmir affairs being entirely unverified and tendentious are universally condemned and resented by Hindus of Kashmir. By encouraging Sheikh Abdullah’s Fascist and Communal Programme he is doing great disservice to the people of Kashmir. His [Abdullah] unwarranted and wrong statements about facts and demolishing mosques inflame Muslims against Hindus…”

Sheikh Abdullah had endeared himself to Nehru — who had called him ‘my blood-brother’ — and others by projecting an anti-feudal, democratic, leftist, pro-India, pro-Congress, and above all, a secular image: perhaps to get Maharaja Hari Singh out of the way, and then to sit in his place; for his later actions belied that image, and disappointed and shocked Nehru. S. Gopal, Nehru’s biographer, had written that Nehru regarded Abdullah as ‘an old friend and colleague and blood-brother’. Nehru held Abdullah beyond suspicion, and trusted him fully. For Nehru, Abdullah was Kashmir, and Kashmir was Abdullah! To have reposed such blind faith in Sheikh Abdullah and in his capability to deliver, grossly overestimating his popularity and remaining innocently unsuspicious of his intentions, even to the extent of being unfair, unjust and insulting to the Maharaja and non-Muslim Kashmiris, reflected negatively on the expected leadership qualities from Nehru.

Wrote Sita Ram Goel: “Pandit Nehru had befriended Shaikh Abdullah simply because the latter was also, and for a long time, a Soviet-addict like him. I have in my possession several pamphlets published by the People's Publishing House [publisher of Communist literature] in praise of the Sher-e-Kashmir.  Pandit Nehru dropped Shaikh Abdullah primarily because the Shaikh picked up a quarrel with Sadiq &Co., the communist clique in Kashmir.”

Sheikh Abdullah was made ‘Head of the Emergency Administration’ in J&K on 30 October 1947 by Maharaja Hari Singh at the instance of Nehru and Mahatma Gandhi. He took oath as Prime Minister of Kashmir on 17 March 1948. He was accused of rigging elections to the Constituent Assembly in 1951. He was dismissed as Prime Minister on 8 August 1953, and was arrested and later jailed for eleven years upon being accused of conspiracy against the State in what came to be known as the ‘Kashmir Conspiracy Case’. Bakshi Ghulam Mohammed was appointed in his place, it was he who had arrested Sheikh Abdulla Wrote MO Mathai:

“When Feroze Gandhi [Indira Gandhi’s husband] heard of the arrest of Sheikh Abdullah in 1953 he came to my study beaming. He said that Bakshi did a foolish thing in arresting Sheikh Abdullah, and added that Bakshi should have had Sheikh Abdullah taken to the top of a lonely hill on the Azad Kashmir border, pushed down and shot, and published the news that Abdullah had fled to Pakistan.”

Sheikh Abdullah was released on 8 April 1964. Nehru passed away on 27 May 1964. Sheikh Abdullah was later interned from 1965 to 1968. He was exiled from Kashmir in 1971 for 18 months. Consequent to the Indira- Sheikh accord of 1974, he became the Chief Minister of J&K and remained in that position till his death in 1982.

Sardar Patel’s correct assessment of Sheikh Abdullah

BN Mullik, who was the then Deputy Director of the IB — the Intelligence Bureau — with charge of Kashmir, and later head of the IB, wrote in his book, ‘My Years with Nehru: Kashmir’ that his report of Kashmir of 1949 stating, inter alia, intense local anti-Pak feelings and no weakening in Sheikh Abdulla’s ideological commitment to India so pleased Nehru that he had copies of the report circulated to all embassies and ministries. However, the realist and wise Sardar Patel, with a gift for making right judgements, was not amused. Here are extracts from the book:

“…Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel was unhappy. This report of mine apparently went against the views which he had held about Kashmir in general and Sheikh Abdullah in particular. He suspected that the Sheikh was not genuine and was misleading Pandit Nehru and was not happy that the report should have been given such wide circulation… A few days after I had sent the report, the Home Secretary informed me that the Sardar did not agree with my assessment and had taken exception to the fact that I had submitted this report without first consulting him…

“I got a summons to see the Sardar the next day. He was not well and was seated on his bed. He looked at me quietly for some time. Then he asked me whether I had written the report, a copy of which was in his hands. I replied in the affirmative. He asked me why I had sent a copy of this to Jawaharlal without consulting him. I replied that I had submitted the report to the Director. Sardar Patel then enquired whether I knew that Jawaharlal had sent copies of this report to all our embassies abroad and what was my reaction to this. I said that I had heard about the circulation only the previous day from the Home Secretary and I was naturally happy to hear that the Prime Minister thought so well of my report that he had thought fit to circulate it to our Ambassadors abroad. The Sardar then said that he did not agree with my assessment of the situation in Kashmir in general and of Sheikh Abdullah in particular…

“The Sardar then gave me his own views about Sheikh Abdullah. He apprehended that Sheikh Abdullah would ultimately let down India and Jawaharlal Nehru and would come out in his real colours; his antipathy to the Maharaja was not really an antipathy to a ruler as such, but to the Dogras in general and with the Dogras he identified the rest of the majority community in India. In his slow voice, he firmly told me that my assessment of Sheikh Abdullah was wrong, though my assessment of public opinion in Kashmir valley about accession was probably correct. After having pointed out what he considered to be my error in judgment, he was, however, good enough to say that he agreed with my views that I should submit only independent assessments to the Government and not tailor them to suit the known or anticipated views of particular leaders. He said that I would soon discover my error but, at the same time, he complimented me on the way the report had been written and the pains I had taken over it. This was the greatness of the Sardar. Whilst disagreeing with my views, he recognised my right to express them…

“That day I came back to my office wondering whether I had really made a mistake in my assessment of Kashmir and whether what the Sardar had said was not right after all. Events, as they turned out subsequently, proved that the Sardar was right and I was not. Within three years we found ourselves fighting against Sheikh Abdullah. Sardar Patel was dead by then. Yet, I feel that possibly events might have turned out differently and the subsequent pain, turmoil, and embarrassments could have been avoided if the special difficulties of Kashmir had been understood by all concerned and they had guided their talks and modified their actions on the basis of this understanding. Probably, things would not have come to this pass at all if the Sardar was still living, because Sheikh Abdullah had a very wholesome respect and fear for him.”

Nehru realizes his blunder

Nehru ultimately realised his blunder after he discovered what Sheikh Abdullah really was. Wrote Balraj Krishna:

“Nehru himself came round to Patel's view later in 1962, when he told Mullik of Abdullah's ‘communal activities throughout the period he had acted as the National Conference leader. It was the Pakistani aggression which had mellowed him a little for a short time, because the tribals had committed gruesome atrocities on the Muslim population in the Valley. But, as soon as he became Prime Minister, he came out in his true colours once again and started his anti-Hindu activities... his entire outlook and behaviour was based on the fact that the Kashmir Valley had a Muslim majority.'”

Blunder–21: Wanting Maharaja to lick his boots

Most unwisely, while Nehru had treated Maharaja Hari Singh ignominiously, he gave all his support to Sheikh Abdullah, little realising that but for the Maharaja’s signature on the Instrument of Accession, J&K could not be a part of India.

When Abdullah launched the ‘abusive and mischievous’ Quit Kashmir agitation against the Maharajah in May 1946 leading to his arrest, Nehru decided to go to the Valley in June 1946 to free Abdullah. Though prohibited to enter the State, Nehru decided to defy the ban. He proclaimed that he wanted to take on the autocratic and the feudal rule that prevailed in Kashmir. Autocratic and feudal rule prevailed in the other 547 Princely States too that ultimately merged with India: Did Nehru go to any of those 547 states to similarly protest — especially the recalcitrant Nizam-ruled state of Hyderabad, where Hindus had been brutally at the receiving end of the Razakars?  Nehru did not seem to realise that the support of the princes and their collaboration would be indispensable in the coming months for persuading them to accede to India.  To take on the Maharaja at that stage, and that too as Congress president, was politically wise. Sardar Patel and others tried to dissuade him, yet he went. Sardar Patel wrote to DP Mishra:

“Though President [Nehru] has been elected for the fourth time, he often acts with childlike innocence, which puts us all in great difficulties quite unexpectedly. You have good reason to be angry but we must not allow our anger to get the better of ourselves... He has done many things recently which have caused us great embarrassment. His action in Kashmir, his interference in Sikh election to the Constituent Assembly, his Press conference immediately after the AICC are all acts of emotional insanity and it puts tremendous strain on us to set matters right…”

Most undiplomatically, even Gandhi, when he went for his only visit to Kashmir in 1947, pointedly rejected the hospitality of the Maharaja, and remained the guest of the National Conference of Abdullah. Rebuffed thus by Gandhi, having been consistently rubbed the wrong way by Nehru, and experiencing the hostility of Nehru towards him over the last many months, and watching the commitment being shown to his arch enemy, Abdullah, why Hari Singh, anybody in his place — Nehru himself, were he in Maharaja's shoes — would have hesitated to accede to India. Hari Singh realised he would have no future with Nehru and Gandhi at the helm. Pakistan he surely did not wish to join. But he did not relish the insistence from Nehru (when Maharaja offered accession in September 1947) to first hand over power to Sheikh Abdullah — as if he were some foreign power who should hand over power to a native. So, the Maharaja started considering his option for independence, which was legally permissible.

If Nehru had dealt with Hari Singh wisely looking to the political options, like Sardar Patel had done in respect of all the other 547 Princely States, had Nehru not allowed his personal bias to dominate, had Nehru accommodated Maharaja suitably, had Nehru convinced him that his interests would be suitably protected if he joined India, Hari Singh may not have dithered and would have signed the Instrument of Accession well before 15 August 1947; and J&K would never have been an issue!

Apart from, “I thought he [Nehru] wanted to make the Maharaja lick his boots...”; Mountbatten had made another observation: “I am glad to say that Nehru has not been put in charge of the new [Princely] States Department, which would have wrecked everything. Patel, who is essentially a realist and very sensible, is going to take it over...Even better news is that VP Menon is to be the Secretary.”

States V Shankar in his book, ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’: “Pandit Nehru regarded it as axiomatic that only Sheikh Abdullah could deliver the goods and was prepared to make any concessions to him to seek his support... Sardar did not trust Sheikh nor did he share Pandit Nehru's assessment of his influence in the State. He felt that our case in Jammu and Kashmir had to be met on the basis of the Maharaja executing the Instrument of Accession, the thought of antagonising the one on whose signature on that document alone we could justify our legal case in Jammu and Kashmir was distressing to him…

“Sardar also felt it would be in the long-term interests of India to utilise the Maharaja's undoubted influence among the various sections of the people to force a permanent bond between the State and India...He [Sardar] was doubtful if the weakening of the administrative authority by the Maharaja to the extent demanded by the Sheikh was in the interests of the State and India.  He felt that the last thing that should occur at that critical period was for the Maharaja and the Sheikh to work at cross-purposes with each other or for the already disillusioned people of the State to harbour doubts about the future of the Government or the Maharaja…

“Sardar Patel also came into conflict with Pt Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar owing to the personal rift between the Maharaja and Sheikh Abdullah. It can scarcely be denied that the latter wanted the Maharaja’s head on a charger and taking advantage of the wrong assessment by Pandit Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar … he literally wanted to dictate his own terms…”

Blunder–22: Kashmiri Pandits Vs. Kashmiri Pandits

The tormentors of the Kashmiri Pandits (KP s) have been Kashmiri Pandits themselves—Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts like Sheikh Abdullah, or Kashmiri-Pandits like Nehru who created the Kashmir problem in the first place; and then, rather than solving it, made it more complicated, and almost insolvable.

Wrote B Krishna in his book ‘Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel’:

“Nehru’s bias in favour of Abdullah was evident from what he said in August 1945 at the annual session of the National Conference at Sopore in the Valley, ‘If non-Muslims want to live in Kashmir, they should join the National Conference or bid goodbye to the country...If Pandits do not join it, no safeguards and weightages will protect them.’” Nehru threatening his own people! And, not for any wrong committed by them. But to undemocratically force them to back a person [Sheikh Abdullah] who turned out to be a bigot, and an anti-national. Half a million Kashmiri Pandits would, some forty-five years later, pay for Nehru’s sins, and be ethnically cleansed out of Kashmir — their home for thousands of years.

Sheikh Abdullah himself was a Kashmiri Pandit convert. The second- generation-convert Sir Allama Muhammad Iqbal, one of the main promoters of the idea of Pakistan, had a major influence on Jinnah in gradually turning him from a liberal, advocating Hindu-Muslim unity, into a bigot. As per the article “Iqbal’s Hindu Relations” by Khushwant Singh in ‘The Telegraph’ of 30 June 2007, Iqbal’s (1877–1938) father was one Rattan Lal Sapru, a Kashmiri Pandit. He was the revenue collector of the Afghan governor of Kashmir. He was caught embezzling money. The governor offered him a choice: he should either convert to Islam or be hanged. Rattan Lal chose to stay alive. He was named Nur Mohammad after conversion. The Saprus disowned Rattan Lal and severed all connections with him.

Those who drove out the Kashmiri Pandits from the valley also happen to be Kashmiri-Pandit-Converts. Fundamentalist Islam is supremacist, intolerant, inhuman, and cruel like the ISIS.

That KPs have been their own worst enemies is highlighted by the following interesting historical episode: Rinchin was a Buddhist from Ladakh. Hinduism (Shaivism) was then the dominant religion in Kashmir. Islam was on the fringe, and was at the time being propagated by Saiyyid Bilal Shah, popular as Bulbul Shah. After Sahadev fled and Dulacha left, Sahadev’s Army Chief, Ramchandra, occupied the throne of Kashmir. But Rinchin, who had a key post in Sahadev’s administration, plotted and eliminated Ramchandra, and sat in his place in 1320 CE. To pacify the public provoked by the misdeed, Rinchin married Kotarani, daughter of Ramchandra. At Kotarani’s behest, discarding Buddhism, Rinchin adopted Shaivism to become acceptable to the public. But the Kashmiri Pandits refused to accept him in their fold, saying that his conversion was not feasible — a legend says they couldn’t decide which caste to put him in. As a reaction to the rebuff, and at the instance of Shah Mir, Rinchin then approached Bulbul Shah, who converted him to Islam, and gave him the name Sultan Malik Sadruddin. Rinchin later built a mosque called the Bodro Masjid, venerated both by the Ladakh Buddhists and the Kashmiri Muslims. With the king converted to Islam, many others followed. And thus, Islam spread in the Kashmir Valley.

This is how Pandits scored a self-goal. So, in a way, the Kashmiri Pandits have themselves to blame for inadvertently giving a push to the Islamisation of the Valley, though it was the later state-backed campaign — through preaching, patronage, incentives, torture and forced conversions — that reduced the Pandits from an overwhelming majority to a minority.

Blunder–23: Sidelining the who could have tackled J&K

The matter of Princely States was under the State’s Ministry, which was under the charge of Sardar Patel. Patel had ably dealt with the complexity of over 500 Princely States. As such J&K should also have been left to Patel. However, Nehru, as Prime Minister, had decided to handle J&K himself. Without the concurrence of Sardar, and without even the courtesy of informing him, Nehru appointed N Gopalaswami Ayyangar, a former Dewan of J&K and a constitutional expert, as a Cabinet Minister without portfolio, to assist him (Nehru) in handling Kashmir. It was this Gopalaswami who had very badly messed up India’s case in the UN later. Sardar became aware of Gopalaswami’s role indirectly when he [Gopalaswami] issued a note in connection with J&K, without consulting Sardar. Wrote Patel to Gopalaswami on 22 December 1947: “This question should have been referred to and dealt with by the Ministry of States…  I would suggest that the relative papers may now be transferred to the States Ministry and in future the Kashmir administration may be asked to deal with that Ministry direct.”

Gopalaswami let the position be known to Sardar (that what he was doing was at the behest of PM Nehru), and expressed his willingness to dissociate himself from the J&K matter if DyPM Patel so desired. Realising the position, Patel wrote back to Gopalaswami the next day on 23 December 1947: “I would rather withdraw my letter and let you deal with matters as you deem best than give you cause for annoyance.” Meanwhile, Nehru, when he became aware of Patel’s above letter of 22 December 1947, chose to write a rather harsh and bossy letter to Patel on 23 December 1947:

“Gopalaswami Ayyangar has been especially asked to help in Kashmir matters. Both for this reason and because of his intimate knowledge and experience of Kashmir he had to be given full latitude. I really do not see where the States Ministry comes into the picture, except that it should be kept informed of steps taken. All this was done at my instance and I do not propose to abdicate my functions in regard to matters for which I consider myself responsible. May I say that the manner of approach to Gopalaswami was hardly in keeping with the courtesy due to a colleague?”

Response to such an intemperate letter was on expected lines. Patel wrote to Nehru on 23 December 1947:

“Your letter of today has been received just now at 7 p.m. and I am writing immediately to tell you this. It has caused me considerable pain. Before I received your letter, I had already written to Gopalaswami a letter of which a copy is enclosed herewith. If I had known (that) he had sent you copies of our correspondence I would have sent to you a copy of my letter to him straightaway. In any case, your letter makes it clear to me that I must not or at least cannot continue as a Member of Government and hence I am hereby tendering my resignation. I am grateful to you for the courtesy and kindness shown to me during the period of office which was a period of considerable strain.”

Apparently, the above letter was not sent at Gandhi’s instance, upon Mountbatten’s advice that without Patel the Government could not be run. Disenchanted and frustrated with Nehru’s hubris, and his improper and thoughtless ways, Patel expressed to Gandhi his wish to dissociate himself from the government in December 1947 and again in January 1948. Wrote Balraj Krishna:

“In taking away Kashmir from the States Ministry and placing it under the charge of Ayyangar who was Minister without Portfolio, Nehru was acting under Abdullah’s influence. To all intents and purposes, he was discarding Patel for Abdullah, ignoring how Patel had stood by his side both as a loyal friend and as a pillar of strength through the tempestuous, nerve-wracking, fateful months preceding and following the transfer of power.”

Nehru wrote a long note to Gandhi on 6 January 1948 seeking his arbitration for his differences with Patel. Gandhi referred the letter to Patel. Patel responded to Gandhi:

“I have tried my best to appreciate what he [Nehru] says on the subject [Hindu-Muslim relations], but howsoever much I have tried to understand it on the twin basis of democracy and Cabinet responsibility, I have found myself unable to agree with his conception of the Prime Minister’s duties and functions. That conception, if accepted, would raise the Prime Minister to the position of a virtual dictator, for he claims ‘full freedom to act when and how he chooses’. This in my opinion is wholly opposed to democratic and Cabinet system of government. The Prime Minister’s position, according to my conception, is certainly pre-eminent; he is first among equals. However, he has no overriding powers over his colleagues; if he had any, a Cabinet and Cabinet responsibility would be superfluous…”

Wrote Durga Das: “Two days earlier [before Gandhi’s assassination on 30 January 1948] I had met Azad and learnt from him that tension between Nehru and Patel had mounted to a point where the Prime Minister had angrily thumped the table at a Cabinet meeting and said: ‘Patel, you do what you like. I will not have it.’ …Nehru’s outburst was basically sparked by the feeling, fed by his courtiers and hangers-on, that Patel was taking the country to the Right… [Now, what was wrong in taking the country to the right! Nehru took the country to dogs with his leftism and poverty- perpetuating socialism!] …When I called on Patel the following day, he told me that Nehru had ‘lost his head’ and he, for his part, had made up his mind not to stand ‘the nonsense any more’. He said he was going to see Gandhi and tell him he was quitting. I said Bapu would never agree to let him go… Patel quietly replied: ‘The old man has gone senile. He wants Mountbatten to bring Jawahar and me together.’…”

Before Gandhi could resolve Patel-Nehru differences, he was assassinated on 30 January 1948. That forced Nehru and Patel together. For the sake of the nation, and to honour the request of the departed soul (Gandhi), Patel sacrificed himself. Patriotically speaking, Patel should not have given way to sentimentality upon Gandhi’s death, and for the sake of the good of the nation, he should have fought out Nehru to its logical end: that is, he should have marshalled all his forces, unseated Nehru, saved India from the depths to which Nehru had ultimately condemned it to, and taken India towards the heights like only he could have.

Notably, even the Deputy Prime Minister of J&K between 1947-53, Bakhshi Ghulam Muhammad of the National Conference, had become so disturbed and alarmed at the way the J&K issue was being messed up that he met Sardar Patel and requested:

“Why do you [Sardar Patel] not take over the problem and finish it like Hyderabad? Patel replied cryptically: You go to your friend [Nehru] and tell him to keep his hands off Kashmir problem for two months and I will undertake to solve it.”

Writes Rajmohan Gandhi in his book ‘Patel–A Life’:

“Patel was as strongly against the reference to the UN and preferred ‘timely action’ on the ground, but Kashmir was Jawaharlal’s baby by now and Vallabhbhai did not insist on his prescriptions when, at the end of December, Nehru announced that he had decided to go to the UN. Jawaharlal obtained Mahatma’s reluctant consent... Patel’s misgivings were amply fulfilled after India invited the UN’s assistance...”

Jayaprakash Narayan, who had been pro-Nehru and anti-Patel had this to admit later: “Kashmir issue, being left to Nehru, proved to be unfortunate for the nation. Because of Panditji’s mishandling, the issue did no longer remain an internal affair, as it should be, but is smouldering as an international issue in the United Nations and its Security Council, making it possible for Pakistan to rake it up every now and then. Many a veteran leader in the country maintains that had the matter been handled by the Sardar, he would have found a satisfactory solution, and thus prevented it becoming a perennial headache for us and a cause of bitterness and animosity between India and Pakistan.”

Sardar Patel had reportedly remarked to HV Kamath that had Nehru and Gopalaswami Aiyangar not made Kashmir their close preserve, separating it from his portfolio of Home and States, he would have tackled the problem as purposefully as he had already done for Hyderabad.

Sardar Patel had told Air Marshal Thomas Elmhirst:

“If all the decisions rested on me, I think that I would be in favour of extending this little affair in Kashmir to a full-scale war with Pakistan… Let us get it over once and for all, and settle down as a united continent.”

Communist MN Roy, no friend of Patel, was also of the opinion that had Kashmir affair remained with Patel, he would have solved it soon after partition. He wrote in “Men I Met” on Patel:

“Could Sardar Patel have had his way on the Kashmir issue, India would not be today spending fifty percent of her revenue on military budget… the Sardar had no choice but to play the game, but one could be sure that he loathes the stupidity clothes in the glamour of popular heroes [hint on Nehru] …”

Nehru, Mounbatten and Patel

Blunder–24: Junagadh: Sardar Patel Vs. Nehru-Mountbatten

Junagadh was a Princely State whose area was about 3,337 square miles, and it was ruled by Nawab Sir Mahabatkhan Rasulkhanji (or Nawab Mahatab Khan III) at the time of independence in 1947. There are many stories of the eccentricity of the Nawab and of his love for dogs, including his expenditure of £21,000 on the wedding of two of his dogs. In the chapter ‘A Junagadh Bitch that was a Princess’ in ‘Maharaja’, Diwan Jarmani Dass states that on the occasion of the marriage of his favourite bitch Roshanara, the Nawab had invited Rajas, Maharajas, Viceroy and other distinguished guests, had declared state holiday for three days, and had entertained over 50,000 guests. The book describes the crazy reception of the bridegroom—a dog:

“The bridegroom’s party was received by the Nawab of Junagadh at the railway station, accompanied by 250 male dogs in gorgeous clothes and jewellery who came in procession from the palace to the station on elephants with silver and gold howdahs. The Ministers and officials of the State and the members of the Royal family of Junagadh were also present at the station to receive Bobby, the bridegroom.”

Junagadh is to the south-west of Kathiawar. Its neighbours were all Indian States, and to its south and south-west is the Arabian Sea. Junagadh had no geographical contiguity with Pakistan. Its distance by sea from Port Veraval to Karachi is about 300 miles. Out of its population of about 6.7 lacs, 82% were Hindu. The people of the state desired merger with India. However, the Nawab signed the Instrument of Accession in favour of Pakistan on 15 August 1947. He was aided by his diwan, Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto — father of the late Prime Minister of Pakistan Zulfikar Ali Bhutto — who was close to Jinnah. The accession was kept a closely guarded secret by Pakistan. Jinnah had reckoned that if sufficient time passed before the matter became known, India would accept the accession as a fait accompli. There were only some rumours; and India made an enquiry with the Pakistan High Commissioner to India in the matter. There was no response. A reminder on 6 September 1947 also elicited no response. It was only on 13 September 1947—about a month after the accession—that India was informed that Pakistan had accepted Junagadh’s accession and had also signed the Standstill Agreement.

The British knew of the accession earlier, but had kept quiet. Mountbatten promptly recognised Junagadh as Pakistani territory, and advised so to the King in his report. He even stated in his report: “My chief concern as Governor-General was to prevent the  Government of India from committing itself on the Junagadh issue to an act of war against what was now Pakistan territory.”

Mountbatten revealed: “Pakistan is in no position even to declare war, since I happen to know that their military commanders [British, at the top level, at that time] have put it to them in writing that a declaration of war with India can only end in the inevitable and ultimate defeat of Pakistan.”

Mountbatten was least concerned that Junagadh, a Hindu-majority state (which was not even a border-state), had acceded to Pakistan. In sharp contrast, he was much concerned that J&K had acceded to India, and played all his dirty games to ensure that the accession became disputed by fooling the gullible Nehru. After Junagadh had acceded to Pakistan Mountbatten wanted to make sure India did not use its armed forces to occupy Junagadh. He played his tricks on Nehru and Gandhi to ensure the same. Expectedly, Nehru, the PM, remained silent! Jinnah had correctly assessed that an ever indecisive and vacillating Nehru would only indulge in his usual “international situation and international reaction” high-talk, but would, again as usual, soft-pedal the whole matter in order to avoid taking any decision or action. As for Lord Mountbatten, the cunning Jinnah knew Mountbatten would not allow India to take any precipitate action. All that Jinnah wanted was that there should be no physical action from India’s side. Gandhi, being a pacifist, and more concerned about his “Mahatma” label and its associated brand of “non-violence”, never considered appropriate action to gain back Junagadh. Given Nehru-Gandhi inaction, only Sardar Patel could have been the rescuer.

“He [Sardar Patel] rejected Nehru’s soft-pedalling in the suggestion that ‘it would be desirable for us to send a message to the British Government about the Junagadh affair’ with a polite comment: ‘I am not quite sure whether we need say anything to the British Government at this stage.’ Patel was not willing to let India revert to the pre-Independence years and allow the British to play their earlier partisan role which was pro-Muslim and pro-Jinnah.”

Sardar Patel vehemently objected to the “forcible dragging of over 80 percent of Hindu population of Junagadh into Pakistan by accession in defiance of all democratic principles”. Jinnah and Mountbatten had failed to factor-in the fact that if there were pacifists on India’s side unassertive on India’s interests like Gandhi and Nehru whom they could manage, fool-around and outmanoeuvre; there was also a wise, don’t-meddle-with-us Iron-Man on India’s side.

All of Mountbatten’s diversionary tactics failed to work on Sardar Patel. Mountbatten tried his options one after the other, as each failed. He counselled Patel on one premise after another: Adverse world opinion! Needless war! War when so many urgent tasks demanded attention! Why not refer the matter to the UNO? If at all necessary, use only the Central Reserve Police, not the Indian Army!

Sardar Patel rejected all of Mountbatten’s options and suggestions, and went in for military operations to settle the issue once and for all. That required guts—something that Nehru and Gandhi lacked. Patel did not let the matter linger, like in cases of Kashmir or Hyderabad. Patel tactfully kept Mountbatten in the dark, and moved troops before Mountbatten came to know. Kathiawar Defence Force, a newly created command of Indian troops, was first deployed in the territory adjoining Junagadh, and then occupied Babariawad and Mangrol, which Junagadh had claimed as its territory.

Sardar planned and executed the Junagadh operation so well that the Nawab of Junagadh fled to Pakistan on 26 October 1947 leaving the state to Shahnawaz Bhutto, who, facing collapse of the administration, invited India on 7 November 1947 to intervene, and left for Pakistan on 8 November 1947. The Indian army moved in on 9 November 1947, and Sardar Patel arrived to a grand reception on the Diwali day of 13 November 1947.

The Nawab fled with his dogs, emptying the treasury of cash and valuables. Leonard Mosley recounts in ‘The Last Days of the British Raj’:

“The Nawab had already fled to Pakistan in his private plane. He crammed aboard as many of his dogs as he could, plus his four wives. One of them discovered, at the last moment, that she had left her child behind in the palace and asked the Nawab to wait while she fetched her. The moment she left the airfield, the Nawab loaded in two more dogs and took off without his wife...”

Wrote V Shankar: “But he [Sardar  Patel] had to contend with two important factors, one of them being Lord Mountbatten... Sardar had to be particularly patient because very often Lord Mountbatten succeeded in enlisting Pandit Nehru’s sympathies for his point of  view... He was convinced that, in this matter of national importance, police action could not be ruled out in the case of Hyderabad and that the threat of its accession to Pakistan must be removed at all costs. As regards Junagadh he was not prepared for any compromise and finally succeeded in evolving and executing his own plans despite Lord Mountbatten’s counsels against precipitating matters or his suggestion of a plebiscite [under UN auspices]... He [Sardar] remarked with a twinkle in his eye, ‘Don’t you see we have two U.N. experts—one the Prime Minister [Nehru] and the other Lord Mountbatten—and I have to steer my way between them. However, I have my own idea of plebiscite. You wait and see...’”

Writes C Dasgupta in ‘War and Diplomacy in Kashmir 1947-48’:

“At the end of September [1947], the Indian government decided that a show of force was unavoidable. Sardar Patel pointed out that by sending its armed personnel into Babariawad, Junagadh had committed an act of war against India. The princely state which had acceded to India had a right to expect that India would protect them against aggression. A weak posture would undermine India’s standing with the Princely States and would have repercussions in Hyderabad, where the Nizam was holding out against accession. In an effort to head him off from this course of action, Mountbatten suggested lodging a complaint to the United Nations against Junagadh’s act of aggression... Patel observed that possession was nine-tenths of the law and he would in no circumstances lower India’s position by going to any court as a plaintiff. The Governor-General asked him whether he was prepared to take the risk of an armed clash in Kathiawar leading to war with Pakistan. The Deputy Prime Minister [Sardar Patel] was unmoved. He said he was ready to take the risk...”

Sardar was really a Sardar—he lived up to his title! Without Sardar, one does not know what other Kashmir-like states or additional Pakistans would have been created—especially, if Mountbatten and Nehru had a free run. If Sardar Patel had not taken the action that he did in Junagadh, and allowed the status Tuo—its accession to Pakistan on 15 August 1947—to continue, India would have faced difficult situation in Hyderabad. Indeed Kasim Rizvi, the leader of Hyderabad’s Razakar, had Tuestioned: “Why is the Sardar thundering about Hyderabad when he cannot control even little Junagadh?”

A plebiscite was held in Junagadh by India. At the instance of Sardar Patel, it was conducted not by the UN, but by an Indian ICS officer, CB Nagarkar, on 20 February 1948, in which 99% — all but 91 persons — voted to join India.  Sardar was not gullible like Nehru to allow himself to be made a fool of by letting Mountbatten have his way, refer the matter to the UN—which Mountbatten had suggested for Junagadh too—and allow domestic matters to be internationalised, and be exploited by Pakistan and the UK.

Patel and Hyderabad Nizam

Blunder–25: Would have been Pakistan-II (Hyderabad)

Historical background & status at Independence

The State of Hyderabad was founded by Mir Qamruddin Chin Qilich Khan, son of Aurangzeb's general, Ghazi-ud-din Khan Feroz Jaug, who traced his ancestry to Abu Bakr, the first Khalifa. The State of Hyderabad first came under the paramountcy of the British in 1766. However, breaking his treaty with the British, the Nizam allied himself with Hyder Ali of Mysore in 1767. Their joint forces were defeated by the British in 1768, and Hyderabad State again came under the paramountcy of the British. In 1799 the Nizam helped East India Company defeat Tipu Sultan. Nizam Mir Usman Ali Khan, the seventh Nizam, ruled the State at the time of Independence. He was granted the title ‘Faithful Ally of the British Government’.

At the time of Independence, Hyderabad was a premier State, with an area of about 2,14,000 square kilometres, population of 16 million, and an annual revenue of 26 crores. It had its own coinage, paper currency and stamps. 85% of its population of 1.6 crores was Hindu. However, the Police, the Army, and the Civil Services were almost completely the preserve of the Muslims. Even in its Legislative Assembly set up in 1946 the Muslims were in majority, despite forming a mere 15% of the population.

Soon after the announcement of the 3^rd June 1947 Plan or the Mountbatten Plan of the partition of India, Nizam declared on 12^th June 1947 that he would neither join India nor Pakistan, but would remain independent. He wanted to secure the Dominion Status for his State from the British, like the one proposed for partitioned India and Pakistan, although the same was not allowed for any Princely State.

Razakars and Nizam

A fanatical Muslim organisation, Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, headed by one Kasim Razvi had been fomenting trouble. They came to be known as the Razakars. At the instance of Kasim Razvi, Nizam appointed Mir Laik Ali as Prime Minister and president of his Executive Council. Laik Ali was a Hyderabadi businessman, who had also been a representative of Pakistan at the UN till September 1947. With this the Hyderabad Government came virtually under Razvi, who later met Sardar Patel and VP Menon in Delhi to tell that Hyderabad would never surrender its independence, and that Hindus were happy under Nizam; but if India insisted on a plebiscite, it is the sword which would decide the final result. Razvi further told Sardar Patel, “We shall fight and die to the last men,” to which Patel responded, “How can I stop you from committing suicide?”

In his speeches in March 1948 and later, Kasim Razvi exhorted the Muslims “to march forward with Koran in one hand and a sword in the other to hound out the enemy.” He declared that “the 45 million Muslims in India would be our fifth columnists in any showdown”. Razvi challenged that “if the Indian Union attempted to enter Hyderabad, it would find nothing but the bones and ashes of 15 million Hindus residing in the State.” He boasted on 12th April 1948 that “the day is not far off when the waves of Bay of Bengal would be washing the feet of our Sovereign”; and that he would “hoist the Asaf Jahi flag on the Red Fort in India”.  Razakars continued their criminal anti-Hindu activities.

At the suggestion of his British and Muslim advisers, the Nizam had planned out several ways to strengthen his position:  acquiring port facilities at Goa from Portugal; getting approval for a rail-corridor from Hyderabad to Goa; taking mine-leases in mineral-rich Bastar; readying more air-fields; acquiring weapons; recruiting more Muslims in the army; recruiting British soldiers; getting Muslims from other states to move into Hyderabad state; converting Dalits to Islam; unleashing militia comprising local Muslims, Pathans and Arabs to intimidate non-Muslims; scaring away Hindus out of Hyderabad state; and so on. Mir Laik Ali had bluffed and boasted: “If the Union Government takes any action against Hyderabad, a hundred thousand men are ready to join our army. We also have a hundred bombers in Saudi Arabia ready to bomb Bombay.”

Nizam-British-Mountbatten-Nehru Vs. Sardar Patel

Wrote VP Menon:

“Warming up Sardar said, ‘You know as well as I do where power resides and with whom the fate of the negotiations must finally lie in Hyderabad. The gentleman [Kasim Razvi] who seems to dominate Hyderabad has given his answer. He has categorically stated that if the Indian Dominion comes to Hyderabad, it will find nothing but the bones and ashes of one and a half crore of Hindus. If that is the position, then it seriously undermines the whole future of the Nizam and his dynasty. I am speaking to you plainly because I do not want you to be under any misapprehension. The Hyderabad problem will have to be settled as has been done in the case of other States. No other way is possible. We cannot agree to the continuance of an isolated spot which would destroy the very Union which we have built up with our blood and toil. At the same time, we do wish to maintain friendly relations and to seek a friendly solution. That does not mean that we shall ever agree to Hyderabad's independence. If its demand to maintain an independent status is persisted in, it is bound to fail.’… But every time any action against Hyderabad was mooted, the communal bogey was put forward as an excuse for inaction.”

Like their pro-Pakistan attitude, many in the Press in Britain and many prominent British leaders were pro-Hyderabad and anti-India. Hyderabad had been their most faithful ally, and they wanted it to be independent and pro-Britain. They did not care if it was a cancer right in the heart of India and had predominant Hindu population of over 85%. Their stand and support, and that of Pakistan, emboldened the Razakars and the Nizam.

While Mountbatten had nothing to say on the grossly unethical, illegal and even barbarous acts of Pakistani raiders in J&K, and of Razakars in Hyderabad; he was liberal in his moral lectures to India, and wanted India “to adopt ethical and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad, and to act in such a way as could be defended before the bar of world opinion.”

V Shankar writes in ‘My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel’: “Hyderabad occupied a special position in the British scheme of things and therefore touched a special chord in Lord Mountbatten... The ‘faithful ally’ concept still ruled the attitude of every British of importance... all the other rulers were watching whether the Indian Government would concede to it a position different from the other states...

“Lastly, on Hyderabad, Pandit Nehru and some others in Delhi were prepared to take a special line; in this Mrs Sarojini Naidu and Miss Padmaja Naidu, both of whom occupied a special position in Pandit Nehru’s esteem, were not without influence. There were also forces which were not slow or hesitant to point out the special position of the Muslims in the state... Apart from Lord Mountbatten’s understandable sympathy for the Muslim position in Hyderabad, shared by Pandit Nehru, in anything that concerned Pakistan even indirectly, he was for compromise and conciliation to the maximum extent possible...”  Nehru never showed similar indulgence towards the Maharaja of Kashmir. Indeed, he was unreasonably hostile to the Maharaja of Kashmir, unnecessarily friendly and brotherly towards Sheikh Abdullah; but indulgent towards the Nizam under whose regime the innocent Hindus were being terrorised by the Razakars and Muslim militias. Mountbatten, also Chairman of the Defence Committee, had recorded:

“Pandit Nehru said openly at the meeting, and subsequently assured me privately, that he would not allow any orders to be given for operations to start unless there really was an event, such as a wholesale massacre of Hindus within the State, which would patently justify, in the eyes of the world, action by the Government of India.”

What would the world think? What Mountbatten thought? What about his own image? These seemed to weigh more with Nehru. Why couldn’t he also think the opposite: that the world would consider India a sissy and a fool to ignore its own Hindu population, which was at the receiving end, and national interests.

By October 1947 Sardar Patel had got sick of negotiations with the Nizam’s representatives, and wanted to break off the negotiations. However, Mountbatten pleaded for more time. Why? The British didn’t wish to displease their faithful ally. Patel was not the only person deciding. There were Gandhi, Nehru, Mountbatten and others. Despite Sardar’s objections, a Standstill (status quo) Agreement was signed between India and Hyderabad in November 1947 for a year. In the subsequent months, Hyderabad loaned rupees twenty crores to Pakistan, placed orders for arms elsewhere, and stepped up its nefarious, anti-Hindu activities through Razakars.

Multiple delegations had discussed numerous proposals with Hyderabad, all to no avail. Mountbatten too tried, but failed. Finally, his tenure over, Mountbatten left India on 21st June 1948. But, before leaving, he tried once more to get very favourable terms for the Nizam by getting Sardar Patel to sign a document as a farewell gift to him. Sardar signed knowing the stubborn Nizam would reject those terms. And, Nizam did reject the document! The moment that happened Sardar declared that thenceforth Hyderabad would be treated on par with other states, and not as a special state. KM Munshi recalled that a day after Mountbatten had left, he had called up Patel, who had responded cheerfully: “Well Munshi, how are you? Is everything all right? What about your Nizam?” KM Munshi was then the Agent-General of India in Hyderabad State. When Munshi asked Patel about a query he had received on behalf of the Nizam on the “Mountbatten Settlement”, Patel shot back, laughing: “Tell him [Nizam] that the Settlement has gone to England. The terms and the talks which Lord Mountbatten had have gone with him. Now the settlement with the Nizam will have to be on the lines of settlements with the other states.”

Operation Polo, thanks to Sardar Patel & Despite Nehru

Distressed about Nehru’s reluctance to act, Patel had written to NV Gadgil on 21 June 1948:

“I am rather worried about Hyderabad. This is the time when we should take firm and definite action. There should be no vacillation; and the more public the action is the greater effect it will have on the morale of our people, both here and in Hyderabad, and will convince our opponents that we mean business. There should be no lack of definiteness or strength about our actions. If, even now, we relax, we shall not only be doing a disservice to the country, but would be digging our own grave.”

One JV Joshi, in his letter of resignation from the Nizam’s Executive Council, wrote that law and order had completely broken down in many districts and that the Nizam’s Police—comprising almost exclusively of Muslims—was colluding with the Razakars in loot, arson and murder of Hindus, and molestation and rape of their females. He stated having himself witnessed such scenes and even scenes where Brahmins were killed and their eyes gouged out. It was estimated that besides the Hyderabad State forces of over 40,000, there were about 2,00,000 Razakars with small arms, and a number of Pathans lately imported. It became morally difficult for India to remain a mute witness to the mayhem, that turned worse by August 1948.

Resistance by Nehru & the British to Any Action On the use of force by India to settle the Hyderabad issue, V Shankar wrote:

“The entire staff for the purpose had been alerted and the timing depended on how long it would take for Sardar to overcome the resistance to this course by C Rajagopalachari, who succeeded Lord Mountbatten as Governor General, and by Pandit Nehru, who found in C Rajagopalachari an intellectual support for his non-violent policy towards Hyderabad...” Shankar quotes Sardar's response to a query, “Many have asked me the question what is going to happen to Hyderabad. They forget that when I spoke at Junagadh, I said openly that if Hyderabad did not behave properly, it would have to go the way Junagadh did. The words still stand and I stand by these words.”

“…The situation in Hyderabad was progressing towards a climax. Under Sardar's constant pressure, and despite the opposition of Pandit Nehru and Rajaji, the decision was taken to march into Hyderabad and thereby to put an end both to the suspended animation in which the State stood and the atrocities on the local population which had become a matter of daily occurrence.”

Wrote MKK Nayar: “Indian Army’s C-in-C was an Englishman named Bucher and the Southern Command was headed by Lieutenant General Rajendra Singhji. Patel knew that Nehru would not agree to military intervention, but anyway sent an instruction through VP Menon to Rajendra Singhji to be ready to act if the need arose. Major General Chaudhry commanded the First Armoured Division which was stationed in the South and Rajendra Singhji decided to keep it ready for war.”

In the Cabinet meeting on 8 September 1948, while the States Ministry under Sardar Patel pressed for occupation of Hyderabad to put an end to the chaos there; Nehru strongly opposed the move and was highly critical of the attitude of the States Ministry [under Sardar Patel].

MKK Nayar also wrote: “Patel believed that the army should be sent to put an end to the Nizam’s highhandedness. At about that time, the Nizam sent an emissary to Pakistan and transferred a large sum of money from his Government’s account in London to Pakistan. At a cabinet meeting, Patel described these happenings and advised that the army may be sent to end the terror-regime in Hyderabad. Nehru who was usually calm, peaceful and good mannered, lost his self-control and said, ‘You are a total communalist and I shall not accept your advice.’ Patel remained unfazed and left the room with his papers. He stopped attending cabinet meetings and even speaking with Nehru after that.”

Wrote Kuldip Nayar: “...Reports circulating at the time said that even then Nehru was not in favour of marching troops into Hyderabad lest the matter be taken up by the UN... It is true that Patel chafed at the ‘do- nothing attitude of the Indian government’...”

Sardar Patel’s daughter’s ‘The Diary of Maniben Patel: 1936-50’ states: “About Hyderabad, Bapu [her father, Sardar Patel] said if his counselling had been accepted—the problem would have been long solved...Bapu replied [to Rajaji], ‘...Our viewpoint is different. I don’t want the future generation to curse me that these people when they got an opportunity did not do it and kept this ulcer [Hyderabad princely state] in the heart of India...It is States Ministry’s [which was under Sardar Patel] function [to make Hyderabad state accede to India]. How long are you and Panditji going to bypass the States Ministry and carry on...Bapu told Rajaji that Jawaharlal continued his aberration for an hour and a half in the Cabinet—that we should decide our attitude about Hyderabad. The question will be raised in the UN...Bapu said, ‘I am very clear in my mind—if we have to fight—Nizam is finished. We cannot keep this ulcer in the heart of the union. His dynasty is finished.’ He (Jawaharlal) was very angry/hot on this point.”

Nehru was so opposed to the use of force against Hyderabad that after Patel got the same approved by the cabinet Nehru called his cabinet colleague Dr Shyama Prasad Mukherjee and remonstrated with him for supporting Patel on the issue, and warned him [being a Bengali] that India’s action would lead to retaliation by Pakistan, which was likely to invade West Bengal, and bomb Calcutta. Unexpected by Nehru, Mukherjee nonchalantly responded that the people of Bengal and Calcutta had enough patriotism to suffer and sacrifice for the national cause, and would be overjoyed when they learn that General JN Chaudhuri, a Bengali, had conquered Hyderabad!

Sardar’s Decisive Action & Attempt to Abort it

Sardar Patel finally prevailed. A decision was finally taken on 9^th   September 1948 to carry out Operation Polo against Hyderabad by sending troops under the command of Major-General JN Chaudhuri.

Jinnah died two days before—on 11 September 1948. In view of the same, the British C-in-C General Bucher had requested for postponement of the operations, but Patel had overruled him: British were looking for ways to save and support Hyderabad. General Bucher had even rung up early morning at 3am HM Patel and others on the D-day of 13th September 1948 to have the operations cancelled or postponed.

The Actual Operations

Very tactfully, Sardar Patel waited for Mountbatten to first go from India for ever, which he did on 21st June 1948—lest he should interfere in the matter. Patel’s most formidable obstacle lay in Mountbatten and Nehru, who had been converted by Mountbatten to his point of view—not to let Indian Army move into Hyderabad. Had Gandhi been alive, perhaps Nehru-Gandhi combine would not have allowed the action that Sardar took, Gandhi being a pacifist. Wrote V Shankar:

“Sardar [Patel] was aware of the influence which Lord Mountbatten exercised over both Pandit Nehru and Gandhiji; often that influence was decisive... Sardar had made up his mind that Hyderabad must fit into his policy regarding the Indian states... I know how deeply anguished he used to feel at his helplessness in settling the problem with his accustomed swiftness... the decision about the Police Action in Hyderabad in which case Sardar [Patel] described the dissent of Rajaji and Pandit Nehru as ‘the wailing of two widows as to how their departed husband [meaning Gandhiji] would have reacted to the decision involving such a departure from non-violence.’”

Sardar Patel had fixed the zero hour for the Army to move into Hyderabad twice, and twice he had to postpone it under intense political pressure from Nehru and Rajaji [C.R.]. When the zero hour was fixed the third time by Patel, again it was sought to be cancelled in response to the appeal of the Nizam to Rajaji. Nehru and Rajaji instead directed VP Menon and HM Patel to draft suitable reply to Nizam on his appeal. Nehru and Rajaji didn’t realise that the Nizam was all along buying time to strengthen himself, and not to reach any amicable settlement.  By then Sardar had had enough of Hamlet Nehru.

While the reply to Nizam was being readied, Sardar Patel, summarily announced that the Army had already moved in, and nothing could be done to halt it. This he did after taking the Defence Minister, Baldev Singh, into confidence!

The operations commenced on 13 September 1948, and after about four days of operations lasting 108 hours, the Hyderabad Army surrendered, with Major-General El Edroos, commander of the Hyderabad Army, asking his troops to yield; and Major-General JN Chaudhuri entered Hyderabad city on 18^th September 1948, taking charge as Military Governor. His administration continued till December 1949. Kasim Razvi was arrested on 19 September 1948.

Reference:

Book - Unabridged Edition, April 2019 Revised & Enlarged to 127 MAJOR BLUNDERS by Rajnikant Puranik | Book can be purchased from www.rkpbooks.com